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No. 70-36 Perry v. Sinderman Argued 1/18/72 
Odessa College case (Texas) where Resp. was a nontenured faculty 
member, with year to year contracts, had been agitating - by testimony and 
otherwise - for conversion of Odessa into a four year college. He had 
sought permission to appear before legislative committees, but had been 
denied permission to leave college. He went anyway, and obviously was a 
controversial faculty member . 
When the Board notified him that his contract would not be renewed, 
he instituted suit immediately (Section 1983, I suppose), claiming denial 
of his constitutional right not to be penalized for exercising First Amend-
ment freedoms. He also claimed denial of due process in the failure of 
the college to give him a hearing. 
On a summary judgment motion, District Court dismissed Sinderman's 
case. 
On appeal, CCA 5 reversed (unanimous decision), and remanded the 
case for a hearing on the merits. The Court held: 
1. That plaintiff's rights were "constitutional rather than 
contractual" citing Fred v. Board of Public Instruction (5th Cir.). 
2. That a hearing on the merits is necessary to determine whether 
such rights have been infringed - the facts being "in total dispute". 
3. As to denial of "procedural due process", the Court held that 
even thought not tenured, Sinderman might have an "expectancy of remployment'.' 
If the facts so indicate, he was entitled - as a matter of due process - to 
notice and hearing, and: 
"The hearing must include the right to produce witnesses 




witnesses produced by the opposition .... (There must 
be) a meaningful opportunity to develop a record which 
can, if necessary, later form a substantial part of a 
court proceeding. " 
My Tentative Views Following Argument: 
(i) The District Court erred in granting summary judgment, and 
we should affirm the Circuit Court's remand for an evidentiary hearing. 
2 • 
(ii) But we should not affirm the holding of the Court with respect 
to a right to a Gold berg v. Wright type of hearing. This is the principal 
issue involved in Roth. Perhaps we should defer a decision in Sinderman 
until the due process issue is decided in Roth. We could then remand 
Sinderman to be decided in light of our Roth decision. 
See the briefs amicus in the Roth case (Jenner, Lee Rankin, and 
others) for reasons why I disagree with the due process conclusion that non-
tenured teachers have a constitutional right to a hearing. 
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.JUSTI CE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS 
May 27, 1972 
Dear Potter: 
., ,,,,_ 
In No. 70-36 - Perry _v. Sindermann , 
please join me in your opinion. 
W. O. D. 




- CHAMBERS OF THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
..§u:p-rtmt <!Jou.rt of t}rt ';!!lnilt~ ,jtattg 
~~u;Jrmg~ IO. QJ. 2.11.;,J!.~ 
June 6, 1972 
No. 70-36 -- Perry v. Sindermann 
Dear Potter: 
I have your proposed opinion affirming the court of 
appeals . 
/ 
My records show 9 votes to reverse, with Bill Douglas 
and Bill Brennan adding "with modifications. 11 
I have not had a chance to analyze your treatment, 
but I want to 'flag' this aspect, given that we are all working 
under the usual June pressure. 
Reg¥W2 0 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to Conference 
P. S. I have not yet analyzed your proposed opinion, No. 71-1 62 --
Regents v. Roth, but a cursory examination suggests that unilateral 
"expectations II are perhaps being given a status never before a cknowl-
edged. The whole purpose of a probationary period could be under-
mined if the "incompetents" made it a practice -- as is commonly 
done -- of picking a "First Amendment quarrel" with the college presi-
dent or dean in the second half of the probat'iona ry year. For me, at 
least, this needs some careful examination because of its impact on 
contract concepts. 
1 ~ • ~ ~u.µumc <!Jou.rt of tfyc 'Jllnitc~ j,tatc$ 
~as-lftngtcn, IB. QJ. 2nJ,J!.2 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
June 6, 1972 
Re: No. 70-36 - Perry v . Sindermann 
No. 71-162 - Board of Regents v . Roth 
Dear Chief, 
This is in response to your note of today about these 
cases, which were argued together and considered together in 
our Conference discussion . 
My understanding of the views expressed at the Con-
ference was that all of us, with the possible exception of Bill 
Rehnquist, agreed that a state university could not refuse to 
rehire a faculty member (or, indeed, any other employee) if 
the basis of that refusal were the faculty member ' s exercise of 
the right to free speech guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. My further understanding of the Conference dis-
cussion was that a majority of us agreed that a state university 
faculty member has no constitutional right to reemployment 
when his contracted for period of employment has ended. 
Furthermore, he has no due process right to a hearing if he is 
not reemployed, unless he can show that he has somehow been 
deprived of liberty or property . He would, therefore, have 
such a right if the university had impaired his liberty by (1) 
personally stigmatizing him, or (2) foreclosing substantial 
employment opportunities elsewhere . He would also have a right 
to a hearing if the university had deprived him of property be-
cause, in fact, by reason •Of the actual "policies and practices of 
the institution, " he was entitled to continued employment, in the 
absence of "cause" to terminate it. 
It was upon this understanding that the opinions in 
these two cases were written, after you assigned them to me. 
This led to a reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment in favor 
of the respondent teacher in Roth . It led to a disagree-
ment with much of the Court of Appeals' rationale in Perry, and 
a remand to the District Court . 
-
~ ·~ . 
- 2 -
I continue to adhere to the views reflected in the two 
opinions I have circulated, believing that they no more than 
reflect ·many previous decisions of the Court . It may be, how-
ever, that I have misunderstood the views of the other Justices. 
As I understand Bill Douglas' dissenting opinion in Roth, he 
thinks that a teacher, as contrasted with other governmental em-
ployees, has a First Amendment right to reemployment simpliciter. 
With that I cannot and do not agree. It is my impression that 
another member of the Court has the tentative view that there is a 
"property" right in any governmental job vacancy. With that I also 
wholly disagree. 
The proposed opinions in this case were circulated two 
weeks ago, on May 23. At our Conference on May 29 I suggested 
that I might have misapprehended the views of a majority of the 
Conference in these cases, and that if I had, the opinions should 
be reassigned to somebody else. I renew that suggestion now. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
r)<;, 
1/ 
Copies to the Conference 
, 
P. S. - I do not think the Due Process Clause entitle•$ a 
person to a hearing simply because his "unilateral" expectations 
have been defeated. As promptly as possible, I shall recircu-
late the opinions with language modifications designed to elim-
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From 1959 to 1969 the respondent, Robert Sindermann, ~ ~ 
was a teacher in the state college system of the State of _ __,,,,,,,,.,_. 
Texas. After teaching for two years at the University '1 + ~I.-. 
of Texas and for four years at San Antonio Junior Col- "' ~ 
Jege, he became a professor of Government and Social '--:> ~ ..\. 
Science at Odessa Junior College in 1965. He was em-
ployed at the college for four successive years, under a ~ 
series of one-year contracts. He was successful enough ..,,,,,,-
to be appointed, for a time, the cochairman of his r:: 
department. 
During the 1968-1969 academic year, however, con- J ._(I-~ 
troversy arose between the respondent and the college ~ ~r 
administration. The respondent was elected president 1..-~l-5. _,, 
of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association. In ....-f f~,,. 
this capacity, he left his teaching duties on several oc- ; _ I 8- • 
casions to testify before committees of the Texas Legis- ~ ~ 
lature, and he became involved in public disagreements 1 ~ 
v,·ith the policies of the college's Board of Regents. In 'lfiV __. • /J. ~ 
particular, he aligned himself with a group advocating ~ , 
the elevation of the college to four-year status-a change ~ 
opposed by the Regents. And, on one occasion, a news- • ~ .. • ~ 
paper advertisement appeared over his name that was .,.,_ 
highly critical of the Regents. ~ ~ 
t .,o ~ ,.,... ..J 
• 
w-.'-• --1- ., ' ·~ s 




2 PERRY v. SINDERMANN 
Finally, in :May 1969, the respondent's one-year em-
ployment contract terminated and the Board of Regents 
voted not to offer him a new contract for the next aca-
demic year. The Regents issued a press release setting 
forth allegations of the respondent's insubordination.1 
But they provided him no official statement of the rea-
sons for the nonrenewal of his contract. And they al-
lowed him no opportunity for a hearing to challenge the 
basis of the nonrenewal. 
The respondent then brought this action in a federal 
district court. He alleged primarily that the Regents' 
decision not to rehire him was based on his public criti-
cism of the policies of the college administration and 
thus infringed his right to freedom of speech. He also• 
alleged that their failure to provide him an opportunity 
for a hearing violated the Fourteenth Amendment's. 
guarantee of procedural due process. The petitioners-
members of the Board of Regents and the president of 
the college-denied that their decision was made in 
retaliation for the respondent's public criticism and 
argued that they had no obligation to provide a hear-
ing.~ On the basis of these bare pleadings and three \ 
brief affidavits filed by the respondent, 3 the District 
Court granted summary judgment for the petitioners .. 
It concluded that the respondent had "no cause of ac--
tion against the [petitioners] since his contract of em-• 
1 The press release stated, for example, that the respondent had' 
defied his superiors by attending legislative committee meetings 
when college officials had sperificail)' refu3ed to permit him tu !ewe 
his classes for that purpose. 
2 The petitioners claimed, in their motion for summ::i ry judg-· 
mellt, that the decision not to retain t he respondent \\·as really 
based on his insubordinate conduct. See n. 1, suvra. 
3 The petit ioners, for whom summary judgmellt was gr::inted, sub--
mitted no affadavit~ wha tever. The respondent's affad:n·its were 
Yery short :llld essentially repeated the general allegations of his 
complaint. 
70-36-OPINION 
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ployment terminated May 31 , 1969, and Odessa Junior 
College has not adopted the tenure system." 4 
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the 
District Court. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F. 2d 939. 
First, it held that, despite the respondent's lack of tenure, 
the nonrenewal of his contract ·would violate the Four-
teenth Amendment if . it in fact was based on his pro-
tected free speech. Since the actual reason for the 
Regents' decision was "in total dispute" in the pleadings, 
the court remanded the case for a full hearing on this 
contested issue of fact. Id., at 942- 943. Second, the 
Court of Appeals held that, despite the respondent's lack 
of tenure, the failure to allow him an opportunity for a I 
hearing would violate the constitutional guarantee of 
procedural clue process if the respondent could show 
that he had an "expectancy" of re-employment. It, 
therefore, ordered that this issue of fact also be aired 
upon remand. Id., at 943- 944. We granted a writ of 
certiorari, 403 U. S. 917, and "·e have considered this 
case along with Board of Regents v. Roth, ante. 
I 
The first question presented is ,vhether the respond-
ent's lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employ-
ment, taken alone, defeats his claim that the nonrenewal 
of his contract violated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. We hold that it does not. - . For at least a quarter century, this Court has made 
clear that even though a person has no "right" to a gov-
ernmental benefit and even though the g'overnment may 
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there -are some reasons upon which the government may not 
~t. It.1,nay not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that 
in.fringes his constitutional rights-especially, hi~t 
4 The findings and conclusions of the District Court-only several 
lines long-are not officially reported. 
70-36-OPINION 
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to freedom of speech. For if the government could deny 
a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally pro-
tected ~eech or associations, his exercise of those rights 
would in effect be rJenalized and inhibited. This would 
allow the government to "produce a result which [it] 
could not command directly.' Speiser Y. Randall, 357 
U. S. 513, 526. Such interference with constitutional 
rights is impermissible. 
We have applied this general principle to denials of 
tax exemptions. Speiser v. Randall, supra, unemploy-
ment benefits, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404-405, 
and welfare payments, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 
618, 627 n. 6; Graham, v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374. 
But, most often we have applied the rinci Jle to denials 
of' public employment. mte Pit lie Workers v. Mite h-
e-rt; 330 U. S. 75, 100; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 
183, 192; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 485-486; 
Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 495-496; Cafeteria 
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894; Cra-mp v. Board 
of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278, 288; Baggett v. 
Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 
17; Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-
606; Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U. S. 54; United States v. 
Robel, 389 U. S. 258; Pickering v. Board of Education, 
391 U. S. 563, 568; Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, at 
We have applied the principle whether the denial J 
of public employment took the form of a dismissal, e. g., 
Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, or nonretention, 
e. g., Shelton v. Tucker, supra, of a present employee. 
Thus the respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure 
"right" to re-employment for the 1969-1970 academic 
year is immaterial to his free speech claim. Indeed, 
t;rc'e before, tfns Court has specifically held that the 
nonrenewal of a nontenured public school teacher's 
one-year contract may not be predicated on his exer-
70-36-OPINION 
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cise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Shel-
ton v. Tucker, supra; Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 
supra. We reaffirm those holdings here. 
In this case, of course, the respondent has yet to 
show that the decision not to renew his contract wasr 
in fact, made in retaliation for his exercise of the con-
stitutional right of free speech. The District Court fore--
closed any opportunity to make this showing when it 
granted summary judgment. Hence, we cannot now I 
hold that the Board of Regents' action was invalid. 
But we agree with the Court of Appeals that there 
is a genuine dispute as to "whether the college refused 
to renew the teaching contract on an impermissible 
basis---=as a reprisal for the exercise of constitutionally 
'"'- ----......... protected rights:' 430 F . 2d, at 943. The respond-
ent has alleged that his nonretention was based on 
his testimony before legislative committees and his other· 
public statements critical of the Regents' policies. And 
he has alleged that this public criticism was within the-
First and Fourteenth Amendment's protection of free-
dom of speech. Plainly, these allegations present a I 
bona fide constitutional claim. For this Court has held 
that a teacher's public criticism of his superiors Q!l 
matters of publlc concern
5
may be constitutionally m:.o-
tected ancfmay, tfierefore, b"'e'an mipermissible basis for 
termination of his~ployment. Pickering v. Board of 
Education, supra. 
For this reason we hold that the grant of summary J 
judgment against the respondent, without full explora-
tion of this issue, was improper. 
II 
The respondent's lack of formal contractual or tenure-
security in continued employment at Odessa Junior Col--
G 
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lege, though irrelevant to his free speech claim, is highly 
releYant to his procedural due process claim. But it may 
not be entirely dis,gositive. 
We have held today in Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, 
that the Constitution does not require opportunity for 
a hearing before the 1rnnrenevval of a nontenured 
te;cher's contract, unless he can show tliat the decision 
not to rehire him somehow deprived him of an interest 
in "liberty" or that he had a "property" interest in con-
tinued employment, despite the lack of tenure or a 
formal contract. In Roth the teacher had not made 
a showing on either point to justify summary judgment 
in his favor. 
Similarly, the respondent here has yet to show that he l 
has been deprived of an interest that could invoke pro-
cedura1 due process protection. As in Roth, the mere 
showing that he was not rehired in one particular job, 
withQ!lt ~ore, did not amount to a shmYing of a loss of 
liberty. 5 Nor did it amount to a sfimnng of a loss of -property. 
But the res )ondent's allegations-·which we must con-
strue most favora y o 1e respondent at this stage of 
the litigation-do raise an issue as to his interest in con-
tinued employment at cfclessa Junior College. H e alleged 
tl~t this mterest, though not secured by a formal con-
tractual tenure provision, ,ms secured by a no less bind- I 
ing understanding fostered by the college administration. 
In particular, the respondent alleged that the college had 
a de facto tenure program, and that he had tenure under 
5 The Court of Appeals suggested t hat the respondent might have-
a due process right to some kind of hearing simplv if he asserts to 
college officials that their decision wns based on his const itutionally 
protected conduct . 430 F. 2d, at 944. "\Ye hnYe rejected this ap-
proach in Board of Regents Y. Roth, ante, at - n. 13. 
70-36-OPIKIOK 
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that program. He claimed that he and others legiti- I 
mately relied upon an unusual provision that had been 
in the college's official Faculty Guide for many years: 
"Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure 
system. The Administration of the College wishes 
the faculty member to feel that he has permanent 
tenure as long as his teaching services are safas--factory and as long as he displays a cooperative 
attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, 
and as long as he is happy in his work." 
Moreover, the respondent claimed legitimate reliance 
upon guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board 
of the Texas College and University System that pro-
vided that a person, like himself. who had been employed 
as a teacher in the state college and university system 
for seven years or more has some form of job tenure.u 
6 The relevant portion of the guidelines, acloptC'd as "Policy Paper 
1" by the Coordimting Board on October 16, 1967, reads: 
"A. Tenure 
"Tenure means assurance to an experienced farulty member that 
he ma!· expect to contimrn in his academic position unless adequate 
cause for dismissal is df'monstrated in a fair hearing , following 
established procedures of clue proress. 
"A specific systf'm of facult!· tenure underp;irds the inteirrity of 
each academic inst itution. In the Texas public colleges and uni-
versities, this tenure s:rntt~m should haw these components: 
"(l) Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time in-
structor or a higher rank, the probationary period for a faculty 
member shall not exceed seYcn yea rs, including within this period 
:-ippropriate full-time sen·ice in all inst itutions of higher education. 
This is subject to the proYi~ion that when, after a term of probation-
ary service of more than three !·cars in one or more institutions, a 
faculty member is emplo!·ed b!· another institution, it may be ngreed 
_in writing that his nc"· appointment is for a probationnry period 
of not more than four years ( even though thereby the person's totaI 
s 
70-36-OPINION 
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Thus the respondent offered to prove that a teacher, ,Yith 
his long period of service, at this particular State College 
had no less a "property" interest in continued employ-
ment than a formally tenured teacher at other colleges, 
and had no less a procedural due process right to a state-
ment of reasons and a hearing before college officials 
upon their decision not to retain him. 
vVe have made clear in Roth, ante, at-, that "pr 
erty" interests subject to procedural due process ~ec-
tion are not limited by a few rigid, technic 
Rather, "property" is a constitutional conce 
notes a range of interests that are secured 
rules or understandings." Id., at-. )erson's inter-
est in a benefit is a "property" intere"' for due )rocess 
purposes 1f there are sue 1 rules or 1 erstandin s that - -SU port lus c aun of ent1t ement to t 1e benefit and that 
he may mvo e a a 1earing. Ibid. 
A written contract with an explicit tenure provision 
clearly is evidence of a formal understanding that sup-
ports a teacher's claim orentitfement to continued em-
ployment unless sufficient "cause" is shown . Yet absence 
of such an_e~licit contractual provision may not always 
fo~close th~possibilit th c~er has a " ro erty" 
interes m re-emp oyment. y ana ogy, the law of con-
tracts long has employed a rocess by which agreements, 
probationary period in the academic profession is extended beyond. 
the normal maxmium of seven years). 
"(3) Adequate cause for dismissal for a faculty member with ten-
ure may be established by demonstrating professiona l incompetence, 
moral turpitude, or gross neglect of professional responsibilities." 
The respondent alleges that, because he has been employed as a 
"full-time instructor" or professor within the Texas College and 







though not formalized in writing, m 
Corbin on Contracts, §§ 561-572A. 
provisions may be supplemented b 
implied from "the promisor's words 
light of the surrounding circumstan 
And, "[ t]he meaning of [the promis 
is found by relating them to the usag_ 
y be "implied." 3· 
xplicit contractual 
other agreements 
nd conduct in the 
Id., at § 562. 
's] words and ac) 
f the past." Ibi 
ithout formal ten-A teacher, lik responden~ 
e able to sho fw1u .LP@ 1roras APS coo 
g£ ~ §l.Jpe,;;i.e~ -Jrow other 
stance§ sarn;i_jrm;g pa§1 11nge-that he has a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to job tenure. Just as this Court 
has found there to be a "common law of a particular 
industry or of a particular plant" that may supplement 
a collective-bargaining agreement, Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Co., 363 U. S. 574, 579, so there may be an 
unwritten "common law" in a particular university that 
certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure. 
This is particularly likely in a college or university, like 
Odessa Junior College, that has no explicit tenure system 
even for senior members of its faculty, but that nonethe-
less may have created such a system in practice. See 
Byse & Joughin, Tenure in American Higher Education 
17- 28. 
In this case, the respondent has alleged the existence· 
of rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered 
by state officials, that may justify his legitimate claim 
of entitlement to continued employment absent "suf-
ficient cause." We disagree with the Court of Appeals 
insofar as it held that a mere subjective "expectancy" is 
protected by procedural due process, but the respondent 
must be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy 
of his claim of such entitlement "under the policies and 
practices of the institution." 430 F. 2d, at 943. Proof 
of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle 
10 
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him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate 
college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where 
he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention 
and challenge their sufficiency. 
Therefore, while we do not wholly agree with the opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals, its judgment remanding this 
this case to the District Court is 
Affirmed .. 
To: The Chief Justice t:.f -f . 
~ ~~ 
,?'Y~ 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Just ice Blackmun 
.,.....-Mr . J ustice Powell 
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In 1968 the respondent, David Roth, was hired for ce--, ~ ,.,,,,,, 
his first teaching job as assistant professor of political • ~~ 
science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. He was r -V 
hired for a fixed term of one academic year. The notice 
of his faculty appointment specified that his employ- a ___ \. I 
ment would begin on September 1, 1968, and would end (l. -
on June 30, 1969.1 The respondent completed that / 
term. But he was informed that he would not be re- Q 
hired for the next academic year. -- ~ I 
1 The respondent had no contract of employment. Rather, his 
formal notice of appointment was the equivalent of an employment 
contract. 
The notice of his appointment proYided that: "David F. Roth is 
hereby appointed to the faculty of the Wisconsin State University 
Position number 0262. (Location:) Oshkosh as (Rank:) Assistant 
Professor of (Department:) Political Science this (Date:) first day 
of (Month:) September (Year:) 1968." The notice went on to 
specifiy that the respondent's "appointment basis" was for the 
"academic year." And it provided that "[r]egulations governing 
tenure are in accord with Chapter 37.31, Wisconsin Statutes. The 
employment of any staff member for an academic year shall not be 
for a term beyond June 30th of the fiscal year in which the appoint-
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The respondent had no tenure rights to continued 
employment. Under Wisconsin statutory law a state 
university teacher ca.n acquire tenure as a "permanent" 
employee only after several years of year-to-year em-
ployment. Having acquired tenure, a teacher is entitled 
to continued employment "during efficiency and good 
behavior." A relatively new teacher without tenure, 
however, is under Wisconsin law entitled to nothing 
beyond his one-year appointment.2 There are no statu-
tory or administrative standards defining eligibility for 
re-employment. State law thus clearly leaves the de-
cision whether to rehire a nontenured teacher for 
another year to the unfettered discretion of University 
officials. 
The procedural protection afforded a Wisconsin State 
University teacher before he is separated from the 
University corresponds to his job security. As a matter 
of statutory law, a tenured teacher cannot be "dis-
charged except for cause upon written charges" and 
pursuant to certain procedures.3 A nontenured teacher, 
similarly, is protected to some extent during his one-
year term. Rules promulgated by the Board of Regents 
~Wisconsin Statutes 1967, c. 37.31 (1 ), in fo rce at the t ime, pro-
Yided in pertinent part that : 
"All teachers in any slate uniYersity shall initially be employed 
011 probation. The employment shall be permanent, during efficiency 
and good behaYior, after 4 yea rs of continuous sen ·ice in the stnte 
university system as a tenrher. " 
3 Wisconsin Statutes 196, , c. 37.31, in fo rce at the time, provided 
in pertinent pnr t that: 
"No teacher who has become permanently employed as herein 
provided shall be discharged except for cause upon wri tten charges. 
Within 30 days of recei,·ing the wri tten charges, such teacher may 
appeal the discharge by a written notice to t he president of the board 
of regents of state colleges. The board slrn ll cause the charges to-
be investigated, hea r the ca~e and provide such teacher wi th a wri tten 
statement as to their decision." 
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pro\·ide that a nontenured teacher "dismissed" before 
the end of the year may have some opportunity for 
review of the "dismissal." But the Rules provide no 
real protection for a nontenured teacher ,Yho simply 
is not re-employed for the next year. He must be 
informed by February first "concerning retention or 
non-retention for the ensuing year." But "no reason 
for non-retention need be given. No review or appea.l 
is provided in such case." 4 
In conformance with these Rules, the President of 
Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh informed the re-
spondent before February 1. 1969, that he would not 
be rehired for the 1969-1970 academic year. He gaye 
the respondent no reason for the decision and no oppor-
tunity to challenge it at any sort of hearing. 
4 The Rules, promulgated b)· the Board of Regents in 1967, 
pro,·ide: 
"RULE I-February 1st is established throughout the State Uni-
,·ersity system as the deadline for written notification of non-tenured 
facult:v concerninp; retention or non-retention for the ensuing year. 
The President of each University shall give such notice each year 
on or before this date." 
"RULE II-During the time a farulty member is on probation, no 
reason for non-retention need be gi,·en. No review or appeal is 
provided in such case. 
"RULE III-'Dismissa l' as opposed to ':'\on-Retention ' means ter-
mination of responsibilities during an academic year. When a non-
tenured fa.cult)· member is dismissed he has no right under Wisconsin 
Statutes to a review of his case or to appeal. The President may, 
however, in his discretion , grant a request for a review within the 
institution, either by a faculty committee or by the President. or 
both. Any such re,·iew would be informal in nature and ,rnuld be 
advisory only. 
"RULE IV-"\Yhen a non-t enured faculty member is dismissed he 
may request a re,·iew by or hearing before the Board of Regents. 
Each such request will be considered separately and the Board will, 
in its discretion, grant or deny same in each indi,·idual case." 
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The respondent then brought this action in a federal 
district court alleging that the decision not to rehire 
him for the next year infringed his Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights. He attacked the decision both in sub-
stance and procedure. First, he alleged that the true 
reason for the decision was to punish him for certain 
statements critical of the University administration, and 
that it therefore violated his right to freedom of speech.5 
Second, he alleged that the failure of University officials 
to give him notice of any reason for nonretention and 
an opportunity for a hearing violated his right to pro-
cedural due process of law. 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
respondent on the procedural issue, ordering the Univer-
sity officials to provide him with reasons and a hearing. 
310 F. Supp. 972. The Court of Appeals affirmed this 
partial summary judgment. 446 F. 2d 806. We granted 
certiorari. 404 U. S. 909. The only question presented l 
to us at this stage in the case is whether the respondent 
had a constitutional right to a statement of reasons and 
a hearl_!_lg on 't!ie University's decision not to rehire 
hfm fo;
0
another year. 6 We hold that he did not. 
5 While the respondent alleged that he was not rehired because of 
his exercise of free speech, the petitioners insisted that the non-
retention decision was based on other, constitutionally valid grounds. 
The District Court came to no conclusion whatever regarding the 
true reason for the University President's decision. "In the pres-
ent case," it stated, "it appears that a determinat ion as to the 
actual bases of [the] decision must await amplification of the facts 
at trial. . . . Summary judgment is inappropriate." 310 F. Supp., 
at 982. 
6 The courts that have had to decide whether a nontenured public· 
employee has a right to a statement of reasons or a hearing upon 
nonrenewal of his contract have come to varying conclusions. Some· 
have held that neither procedural safeguard is required. E. g., Orr 
v. Trinter, 444 F. 2d 128 (CA6) ; Jones v. Hopper, 410 F. 2d 1323 
(CAlO); Freeman v. Gould Special School District, 405 F . 2d 1153-
J .,,,, ,., 
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5. 
The requirements of procedural due process apply only 
to the deprivation of interests encompassed within the 
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and prop-
erty. When _grotected interests are implicated the right 
to-!ome kind of prior hearing is para1E.9unt.1 But7-he 
range of rnterests protected by procedural due process 
is not infinite. 
The District Court decided that procedural due proc-
ess guarantees apply in this case by assessing and 
balancing the weights of the particular interests in-
volved. It concluded that the respondent's interest in 
re-employment at the Wisconsin State University-
Oshkosh outweighed the University's interest in deny--
ing him re-employment summarily. 310 F. Supp., at 
977-979. Undeniably, the respondent's re-employment 
prospects were of major concern to him-concern that 
we surely cannot say was insignificant. And a weighing 
process has long been a part of any determination of 
the form of hearing required in particular situations 
(CA8). At least one court has held that there is a right to a 
statement of reasons but not a hearing. D rown v. Portsmouth School 
District, 435 F. 2d 1182 (CAI). And another has held that both 
requirements depend on whether the employee has an "expectency" 
of continued employment. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F. 2d 852, 
856 (CA5). 
7 Before a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be 
afforded opportunity for some kind of a hearing, "except for extraor-
dinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at 
stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event."' 
Boddie v. Connecticut, -101 U. S. 371, 379. "While '[m]any con-
troversies have raged about ... the Due Process Clause,' ... it is 
fundamental that except in emergency situations [and t his is not 
one] due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate [a 
protected] interest ... , it must afford 'notice and opportw1ity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termina-
tion becomes effecfo·e." Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542. For-
6 
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by procedural due process.8 But, to determine whether I 
due process requirements apply in the first place, we 
must look not to the "weight" but to the nature of -the interest at stake. See 1vf orrissey v. Brewer, - U. S. 
- , -. We must look to see if the interest is within 
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and 
property. 
"Liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic 
terms. They are among the "[g]reat [constitutional] 
concepts . . . purposely left to gather meaning from 
experience. . . . [T]hey relate to the whole domain 
of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who 
founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant 
society remains unchanged." National Ins. Co. v. Tide-
water Co. , 337 U. S. 582, 646 (Frankfurter, J. , dissent-
ing). For that reason the Court has fully and finally 
rejected the wooden distinction between "rights" and 
"privileges" that once seemed to govern the applica-
bility of procedural due process rights. 9 The Court has 
the rare and e;-.i raordinar~' situ;ttions in which we have held that 
deprirntion of a protected interest need not be preceded by oppor-
tunity for some kind of hea ring, see, e. g., Central Union Trust Co. 
v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 56G: Phillips v. Comrnissioner, 283 U.S. 
589, 597 ; Ewing v. M ytinger cf· Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594. 
8 "The formali ty mid procedural requisites for tho hea ring can 
va ry, depending upon the importance of the in terests invoh·ed and 
t he nature of the subsequent proceedings." B oddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U. S. 371 ,378. See, e. g., Goldberg v. K elly, 397 U.S. 2.54, 263; 
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420. The constitut ional requirement 
of opportunity for some form of hea ring before deprivation of a 
protected interest, of course, does not depend upon ouch a narrmv 
balancing process. Sec n. 7, sitpra. 
9 In a leading case decided many years ago. the Court of Appeals 
for t he District of Columbia Circuit held that public employment in 
general was a "priYilege," not a "right ," and that procedural due proc-
ess guarantees therefore were inapplicable. Bailey v. R ichardson, 18Z 
F. 2d 46, aff'd by an equally di vided Court, 341 U.S. 918. The basis: 
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also made clear that the property interests protected by 
procedural due rocess extend well be ond actual own-
ership o rea. estate, chattels, or money.10 By the \ - -same token, the Court has required due process protec-
tion for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal 
constraints imposed by the criminal process.n 
Yet, while the Court has eschewed rigid or formalistic 
limitations on the protection of procedural due process, 
it has at the same time observed certain boundaries. 
For the words "liberty" and "property" in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
. . 
given some meanmg. 
II 
"While this Court has not attempted to define with 
exactness the liberty ... guaranteed [by the Fourteenth -Amendment] the term has received much consideration, 
and some of the included things have been definitely 
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom 
frop1 bodily restraint but also the right of the individual 
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
of this holding has been thoroughl:v undermined in the ensuing years. 
For , as MR. JUSTICE BLACKMU::-r wrote for the Court only last year, 
"this Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights 
turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 
' right' or as a 'privilege.'" Graham v. R ichardson, 403 U. S. 365, 
374. See. e. g., Mo rrissey v. Brewer, - U. S. - . - : B ell v. 
Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539 ; Goldberg v. K elly, 397 U. S. 254, 262 ; 
Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U. S. 611'. 627 n. 6; Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 
404. 
10 See, e. g., Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U. S. 207, 208; Bell 
v .. Burson, 402 U. S. 535; Goldberg v. K elly, 397 U. S. 254. 
11 "Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' [in 
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause] wit h any great pre-1 
cision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily ref 
straint." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499. See, e. g., Stanley 
v. Illinois, - U. S. -; Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545. 
8 
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tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
e~h a home and brrn u) children, to ,rnrship God 
accor mg to t 1e dictates of his own conscience. and 
generally to enjoy those privileges Ion · reco nized .. . -as essential to the or er y pursuit of happiness by free 
men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399. In I 
a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt 
that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. 
See, e. g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499- 500; 
Stanley v. Illinois, - U. S. - . 
There might be cases in ,vhich a State refused to re- , 
employ a person under such circumstances that interests 
in liberty would be implicated. But this is not such a 
case. 
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did 
not make any charge against him that might seriously 
damage his standing and associations in his community. 
It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a 
charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dis-
honesty, or immorality. Had it done so, this would be 
a different case. For "[w]here a person 's good name, 
reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of 
what the government is doing to him, notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are essential." Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437. Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U. S. 183, 191 ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Committee v. M cGra.th, 341 U. S. 123; United States 
Y. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 316-317; Peters v. H obby, 349 
U. S. 331, 352 ( concurring opinion) . See Cafeteria 
Workers v. M cElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 898. In such a. 
case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute 
the charge before University officials.12 In the present 
12 The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person 
an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his 
name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to 
deny him future employment for other rea.,;ons. 
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case, however, there is no suggestion whatever that the I 
respondent's interest in his "good name, reputation , honor 
or integrity" is at stake. 
Similarly, t_here is no suggestion that the Sta.te, in 
declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him 
a sti ma or other formal disability that foreclosed a 
range of other employment op:gortu111t1es. The tate, I 
"or example, did not mvoke any regulations to bar 
the respondent from all other public employment in 
State universities. Had it done so, this, again, would 
be a different case. For " [ t] o be deprived not only of 
present government employment but of future oppor-
tunity for it is no small injury . . .. " Joint Anti-Fascist 
R efugee Cornmittee v. McGrath, supra, at 185 (Jackson, 
J., concurring). See Trua.1; v. Raich, 23!} U. S. 33, 41. 
The Court has held that a State, in regulating eligibility 
for a type of professional employment, cannot foreclose 
a range of opportunities "in a manner . . . that con-
travene[s] due process," Schware v. Board of Bar Ex-
arniners, 353 U . S. 353 U. S. 232, 238, and, specifically, 
in a manner that denied the right to a full prior hear-
ing. Willner v. Cornrnittee on Character, 373 U. S. 96, 
103. See Cafeteria Workers v. M cElroy, supra, at 898. 
In the present case, however, this principle does not 
come into play.13 
13 The District Court made an assumption "that non-retention by 
one university or college creates concrete and practical difficulties for 
a professor in his subsequent academic ca reer ." 310 F. Supp., at 
979. And the Court of Appeals based its affirmance of the summary 
judgment largely on the premise that "the substantial adverse effect 
non-retention is like!~, to have upon career interests of an individual 
professor" amounts to a limitation on future employment opportuni-
ties sufficient to invoke procedural due process guaranties. 446 F. 
2d, at 809. But the record contains no support for these assump-
tions. There is no suggestion of how nonretention might affect the 
respondent',; future employment prospects. Mere proof, for example, 
that his record of nonretention in one job, taken alone, might make 
10 
71-162-OPINION 
BOARD OF REGENTS v. ROTH 
To be sure, the respondent has alleged that the non- I 
rene,val of his contra.ct ,vas based on his exercise of his 
right to freedom of speech. But this allegation is not 
now before us. Because the District Court stayed pro-
ceedrngs on this issue, the respondent has yet to prove I 
that the decision not to rehire him was, in fact, based 
on his free speech activities.14 
him somewhat less att rart in to some other employers would hardly 
establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a 
<leprivation of " liberty ." Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 
supra. 
14 See n . 5, infra.. The Court of Appeals, nonetheless, argued that 
opportunity for a hea ring and a statement of reasons were required 
here "as a prophylactic against non-retention decisions improperly 
motivated by exercise of protected rights ." 446 F. 2d, at 810 
( emphasis supplied ). While the Court of Appeals recognized the 
lack of a finding that the respondent's nonretention was based on 
exercise of the right of free speech, it felt that the respondent's 
interest in liberty was sufficiently implicated here because the de-
cision not to rehire him was made "with a background of contro-
.-ersy and unwelcome expressions of opinion ." Ibid. 
\Yhen a State would directly impinge upon interests in free speech 
or free press, this Court has on occRsion held that opportunity for 
a fair adversary hearing must precede the act ion , whether or not 
the speech or press intere,:t is clea rly protected under substantive 
First Amendment standards. Thus we have required fair notice and 
opportunity for :m :1d ,·er8n r~· hen ring before an injunction· is issued 
agninst the holding of rnllies and public meetings. Carroll v. Prin-
cess Anne, 393 U.S. 175. Similnrly, we have indicated t he necessity 
of procedural safeguards before a State makes a large-scale seizure 
of a person's allcgedl:,.· obscene books, magaz ines and so forth. A 
Quantity of Books v. Kan,sas, 378 U.S. 205; Marcus v. Search War-
rant, 367 U. S. 717. Sec Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51; 
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58. See genernlly Monaghan , 
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 H an ·. L. R ev. 518. 
In t he respondent 's case, howe,·er, t he State has not directly im- \ 
pinged upon interests in free speech or free press in nny \\·ay com-
parable to a seizure of books or an injunction aga inst meetings. 
The interest in holding a. teaching job at a state university, simpliciter, 
is not itself a free speech interest. A goYcrnmentally employed. 
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Hence, on the record before us, all that clearly appears 
is that the respondent was not rehired for one year at 
one University. It stretches the concept too far to 
suggest that a person is deprived of "liberty" when he 
simply is not rehired in one job but remains a.s free as 
before to seek another. Cafeteria Workers v. M cElroy, 
sitpra, at 895-896. 
III 
The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection 
of property is a safeguard of the security of interests 
that a person has already acquired in specific benefits. 
These interests-property interests-may take many 
forms. 
Thus the Court has held that a person receiving wel-
fare benefits under statutory and administrative stand-
ards defining eligibility for them has an interest in 
continued receipt of those benefits that is safeguarded 
by procedural due process. Goldberg v. K elly, 397 U. S. 
254.1 0 See Fle11iir1g v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611. Simi-
teacher's interest in being allowed to say what he wants to say \ 
in or out of his classes is a free speech interest, bu t his interest 
simply in continuing to hold the job is not. 
1 " Goldsmith v. Board of 1'ax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117. is a related 
case. There, the petitioner was a lawyer who had been refused ad-
mission to practice befo re thP Board of Tax Appeals. The Board had 
"published rules for admission of persons ent itled to practire before it, 
by which attorneys at lnw [l dmitted to courts of the United States and 
the States, a.ud the District of Columbia, as well as certified public 
accountants duly qualified under the law of any State or the Dis-
trict, are made eligible. . . . The rules further provided that the 
Board may in its discretion deny admis~ion to any applicant , or sus-
pend or disbar any person after admission ." Id., at 119. The Board 
denied admission to the petitioner under its discretionary power, 
without a prior hea ring and a statement of the rensons for the denial. 
Although this Court disposed of the case on other grounds, it stated, 
in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taft, that the existence of the 
Board's eligibility rules gaye the petitioner an interest and claim 
12 
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larly, in the area of public employment, the Court has ( 
held that a public colJeo-e )rofessor di · cl from an of-
fic,t; held under ten ure,,J)rovisions, Slochower v. Boar of 
Education, Mu U. S. 551, and college professors and 
staff members dismissed during the terms of their con-
tracts, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, have interests 
in continued employment that are safeguarded by due 
process. Only last year, the Court held that this princi-
ple "proscribing summary dismissal from public employ-
ment without a hearing or inquiry required by due 
process" also applied to a teacher recently hired without 
tenure or a formal con.tract, but nonetheless ,vith a. clearly 
implied promise of continued employment. Conn ell v. 
Higgenbotham, 403 U. S. 207, 208. 
Certain attributes of "property" interests protected 
by p°Tc>ceduraf due process emerge from these dec1s10ns. 
T;,r-ave a property rnterest m a benetlt, a person cl~arly 
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. 
He must have more than a unilateral expectation of 
it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of en-- - -titlement to it. It is a puq)ose of the ancient instit,ution 
of property to protect those claims upon which people 
rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbi-
trarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitu-
tional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for 
a person to vindicate those claims. 
Property interests, of course, are not created by the 
Constitution. lhther, they are created and their di-
mensions arn defined b existino- rules or understand-
ings-rues or un erstanclings that secure certain benefits 
to practice before the Board to which procedural due process re-
quirements applied. It said that the Board's discretionary power 
"must be construed to mean the exercise of a discretion to be 
exercised after fair investigation, with such a notice, hearing and 
opportunity to answer for the applicant as would constitute due-
process." Id ., at 123. 
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and that support claims of entitlement to those bene-
fits. Thus the welfare recipients in G.oldberg \'. Kelly, l 
supra, had a claim of entitlement ,, fare payments 
tl at was rounde m the tute definin · eli 1 1 1ty or 
them. T 1e recipients had not ye own that t ey 
w-;;, in fact, within the statutory terms of eligibility. 
But we held that they had a right to a hearing at which 
they might attempt to do so. 
Just as the welfare recipients' "property" interest in 
welfare payments was created and defined by statutory 
terms, so the res Jon dent's " ert " interest in em loy-
ment at the Wisconsin State University-Os -osh was ere--ated and defined by the terms of his appointment. Those 
terms secured his interest 111 employment up to June 30, 
l 
1969. But the important fact in this case is that they 
specifically provided that the respondent's employment 
was to terminate on June 30. They did not provide for 
contract renewal absent "sufficient cause." Indeed, they 
made no provision for renewal whatsoever. -
"'I1hus the terms of the respondent's appointment se-
cured absolutely no interest in re-employment for the 
next year. They supported absolutely no possible claim 
oT entitlement to re-emp-ioyment. Nor, s1gmhcantly, w""ts 
there any state statute or University rule or policy that 
secured his interest in re-employment or that created any 
legitimate claim to it.16 In these circumstances, the re-
spondent surely had an abstract concern in being rehired, 
but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require 
the University authorities to give him a hearing when 
they declined to renew his contract of employment. 
16 To be sure, the respondent does suggest that most teachers hired 
on a year-to-year basis by the Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh 
are, in fact, rehired. But the District Court has not found that 
there is anything approaching a "common law" of re-employment, 
see Perry v. Sindermann, post, at -, so strong as to require Unj -
versity officials to give the respondent a statement of reasons and a 
hearing on their decision not to rehire him. 
~ ~Jl.,~ + ~ 
0.-, ~ .J&,-1•.t«A J;-
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IV 
Our an lysis of the respondent's constitutional rights 
. in this ca does not in any way indicate a view that ;;y-!E'rovision f an opportunity for a hearing an1} a state-ment of asons for nonretention would be inappro-
priate or unwise in public colleges and universities. 
Tudeed, t es@ lii~cio eroo,Hi~~l @ttkgaatrh, might be most 
salutary. 
~s a written Constitution that we apply. We 
must conclude that the summary judgment for the re-
spondent should not have been granted, since the re-
spondent has not shown that he was deprived of liberty 
or property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is 
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
17 See, e. g., Report of Committee A on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure, "Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewa1 of 
Faculty Appointments," 56 AA UP Bulletin 21 (Spring 1970) . 
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No . 71-162, Board of Regents ~ Roth 
The changes indicated on the enclosed 
pages are in response to suggestions from 
Bill Rehnquist . The changes will be made 
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,June 21, 1972 
Re: No. 70-36 Perry v. Sinderman 
No. 71-162 Board of Regents v. Roth 
Dear Potter: 
Your excellent opinions have been strengthened, I think, 
by the changes circulated on yesterday. 
I may talk to you further, and to the Conference, as to 
whether I should participate in these cases. But whether I do or 
not, it occurred to me in reading them over last night that you might 
take a look at these suggestions: 
1. In Roth (p. 14), I would prefer not to commend expressly 
the "provision of an opportunity for a hearing" with respect to every 
teacher and professor situated as was Roth. My recollection is that 
an amicus brief from the City of New York indicated that there are 
thousands of non-tenured teachers in the city educational system, 
with substantial ''turnovers" each year. I would think a statement 
of reasons for non-retention would be appropriate, but once a school 
or college adopted the practice - however voluntarily - of holding 
a hearing this in itself might become such an "expectation" as to 
create rights. 
In short, I would omit reference to the desirability of 
affording an opportunity for a hearing. 
2. In Sinderman, it seems to me that you go beyond Roth 
in the description of the type of "property" interest that might give 
- 2 -
rise to due process rights. Compare pages 8 and 9 of Perry with 
what seems to me to be the more restrictive language in Roth. 
I appreciate, of coorse, that the facts in the two cases vary 
significantly. Sinderman had been on the faculty for a number of 
years, and the paragraph in the Faculty Guide was certainly relevant. 
Yet, the general articulation of the "property interest" concept seems 
to me to go beyond the facts. 
For example, on page 8, last sentence in the first full para-
graph refers to "rules or understandings". I would think the latter 
term, without qualification, would unduly expose the college. You 
might consider changing it to "rules or mutually explicit under- _ 
standings". 
I have another suggestion which I will deliver to you, as it 
is a little difficult to explain without prolonging this memorandum. 
* * * * * 
The foregoing, of course, are merely for your consideration. 
I have not given these cases the care and attention which you obviously 
have. 
Sincerely, 
Mr .. Justice Stewart 
- j;itµ-rnnc (!j:ou.rt of flF ~ ifrh .§tatcs-}Ua.s l-rngt-111, p. ~. 2.0ffen~ 
CHAM BERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
June 21, 1972 
70-36 - Perry v. Sindermann 
Dear Chief, 
In order to make perfectly clear that the opinion 
in Sindermann does not undertake to create "a federal common 
law of implied contracts, " I plan to add the following footnote 
at the end of the first full paragraph on page 9 of the opinion: 
I 
- We do not now hold that the respondent has 
any such legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure. 
For "[p ]roperty interests ... are not created by the 
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or understandings. 
. . . " Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, at 12. And the 
ultimately governing "rules" in a case such as this one 
are the rules of state law. It may be that the law of 
Texas is clear that a teacher in the respondent's posi-
tion has no contractual or other claim to job tenure. 
If that is the case -- if the petitioners can show on re-
mand that state law specifically rejects any claim of 
any kind of "property" interest in these circumstances --
then the respondent's clairr would be defeated. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely yours, 
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CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
June 21 , 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE : 
No . 70-36 - - Perry v. Sindermann 
No . 71-162 - - Board of Regents v. Roth 
Dear Potter: 
I agree with most of your new drafts in Perry and Roth, but I 
have problems with the definition of the ''property'' interest that is 
protected by procedural due process . Although your opinions citeCor-
bin, you effectively direct the creation of a federal common law of 
implied contracts . It seems to me, though, that the issue whether 
teachers -- and all other state employees - have a property interest 
in re-employment, which should be protected by procedural due process, 
should be determined under state contract law. This, of course, 
would include the law of implied contracts . In other areas (e.g., welfare 
rights in Goldberg v . Kelly, drivers' licenses in Bell v . Burson, and 
liberty on parole in Morrissey v . Brewer), the Court has effectively 
created the substantive right in providing the procedural right but not 
on a contract base . It has ignored the absence of a substantive right 
under state law . But, in the situation of state employment, it seems to 
me that the substantive right should be defined by state contract law. 
Here the state is acting as employer , an area in which discretionary 
action is generally recognized as legitimate. States enter into contracts 
with employees as a result of arms - length negotiation. And there is an 
existing body of state law governing the rights and duties of such re-
lationships. In this context, I see no justification for the creation of a 
federal commo n law of implied contract right to re-employment and I 
question whether we have sufficiently explored the ramification of Perry 
in particular . 
I hope to get out a memo today on this . 
Regards , 
Mr . Justice Stewart 
Copies to Conferenc e 
lui~ 
Stnderman 
pg. 9 - Suggested substitute 
for first sentence of first 
paragraph 
A teacher, like respondent who has held his position for 
a number of years, might be able to show from the circumstances 
of this service - and from other relevant facts - that he has a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure. 
- j,1tp-rmte ~curt of Ure 'Jllnitr~ .§htkil 'Jllla.a-Irington, p. <!J. 20biJi2 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
J---. 
June 21, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 70-36, Perry v. Sindermann 
No. 71-162, Bd. of Regents v. Roth 
The changes indicated on the enclosed 
pages of these opinions are in response to Lewis 
Powell's suggestions. These changes will be 










PERRY v. SINDERl\IANN" 
Thus the respondent offered to prove that a teacher, with 
his long period of service, at this particular State College 
had no less a "property" interest in continued employ-
ment than a formally tenured teacher at other colleges, 
and had no less a procedural due process right to a state-
ment of reasons and a hearing before college officials 
upon their decision not to retain him. 
·we have made clear in Roth, ante, at-, that "prop-
erty" interests subject to procedural due process protec-
tion are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms. 
Rather, "property" is a constitutional concept. It de-
notes a range of interests that are secured by 1'existing 
rules or understandings." Id., at-. A person's inter-
est in a benefit is a "property" interest for due process 
purposes if ther~ are such rules or[understandmgs that 
support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that 
he may invoke at a hearing. Ibid. 
A written contract with an explicit tenure provision 
clearly is evidence of a formal understanding that sup-
ports a teacher's claim of entitlement to continued em-
ployment unless sufficient "cause" is shown. Yet absence 
of such an explicit contractual provision may not ahrnys 
foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a "property" 
interest in re-employment. By analogy, the law of con-
tracts long has employed a process by which agreements,. 
probationary period in the academic profession is extended beyond 
the normal maxrnium of seven years) . 
"(3) Adequate cause for diomissal for a faculty member with ten-
ure may be establishrd by drmonstrating professional incompetence, 
moral turpitude, or gross ueglect of professional responsibilities." 
The respondent a.lieges that, because he has been employed as a 
"full-time instructor" or professor within the Texas Coll<'ge and 







PERRY v. SINDERMANN 9 
though not formalized in "Titing, may be "implied." 3 
Corbin on Contracts, §§ 561-572A. Explicit contractual 
provisions may be supplemented by other agreements 
implied from "the promisor's words and conduct in the 
light of the surroundiug circumstances." Id., at § 562. 
And, "[t]he meaning of [the promisor's] words and acts 
is found by relating them to the usage of the past." Ibid. 
A teacher, like the respondent, ~1',howt farm.al 181:1: 
:WP8 ttligM ls!@ 1.,bl:0 t8 olw;; fiDlii Che \\Olds and een-
@Met, of his mt'ti)8riorilj fp0fl't ether st11110w1,cli1~g oir@~• 
shll!H!OO ,a1~t-l +Pmlt f.J8:Bt 1,w9go tli½st liJ:o hss tt lcgi:MR,ato 
-elttin~. @f 011 ti.thn:i..,m,t to j0t"J tonw POr Just as this Court 
has found there to. be a "common law of a particular 
industry or of a particular plant" that may supplement 
a collective-bargaining agreement, Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Co., 363 U. S. 574, 579, so there may be an 
unwritten "common law" in a particular university that 
certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure. 
This is particularly likely in a college or university, like 
Odessa Junior College, that has no explicit tenure system 
even for senior members of its faculty, but that nonethe-
less may have created such a system in practice. See 
Byse & Joughin, Tenure in American Higher Education 
17-28. 
In this case, the respondent has alleged the existence 
of rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered 
by state officials, that may justify his legitimate claim 
of entitlement to continued employment absent "suf-
ficient cause." We disagree with the Court of Appeals 
insofar as it held that a mere subj ective "expectancy" is 
protected by procedural due proct' 3, but the respondent 
must be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy 
of his claim of such entitlement "under the policies and 
practices of the institution." 430 li'. 2d, at 943. Proof 
of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle 
who has held · 
his position for 
a number of years , 
might be able 
to show from the 
circumstances of 
this service --
and from other 
relevant facts 
that he has a 
a legitimate 
claim of entitle-







BOARD OF REGENTS v. ROTH 
IV 
0 
ia Uiis @as@· soc" l'lob in rm:, wu::, inelieB:te a, vie..- th~ _fl-.---
~Ptnisiol"I of 8:11 or:,porttrnit, rm l'i: hee.l'tH!!: aHa 8, sta~ .-
~eH>t, ef retH:!61lS f(")ti nom·etentio,, .. otdd be ine.ppre--
~11ia.to gr 1,1,mriiifil i~ pul,~i@ 00llegeo &n!'l uuin~riiiiiQio 
~ees. H~eee BM'lie l)roeedmttl :1.!eefe.!!tttttde mi!:M be n~oeti-
~~1 
~wt it ie ee .. rittcl"I Co11:1sti~tt~itm tHa:t II e tt~pl..::'j'. ·we 
must conclude that the summary judgment for the re-
spondent should not have been granted, since the re-
spondent has not shown that he was deprived of liberty 
or prqperty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is 
reversed. and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Our analysis of the respondent's consti-
tutional rights in this case in no way indicates 
a view that an opportunity for a hearing or 
a statement of reasons for nonretention would, 
or would not, be appropriate or wise in public 
colleges and universities. 1.]_/ For it is 
a written Constitution that we apply. Our 
role is confined to interpretation of that 
Constitution. 
17 See, e. g., Report of Committee A on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure, "Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrencwal of 
, Faculty Appointments," 5G AA.UP Bulletin 21 (Spring 1970). 
-
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case, however, there is no suggestion whatever that the 
respondent's interest in his "good name, reputation, honor 
or integrity" is at stake. 
Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in 
declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him 
a stigma or other formal disability that foreclosed a 
range of other employment opportm1ities. The State,. 
for example, did not invoke any regulations to bar 
the respondent from all other public employment in 
State universities. Had it done so, this, again, would 
be a different case. For "[t]o be deprived not only of 
present government employment but of future oppor-
tunity for it is no small injury . ... " Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Comm,ittee v. McGrath, supra, at 185 (Jachon, 
J ., concurring). See Trua.?; v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41. 
The Court has held that a State, in regulating eligibility 
for a type of professional employment, cannot foreclose 
a range of opportunities "in a manner . . . that con-
travene[s] due process," Schware v. Board of Bar Ex-
am,iners, 353 U. S. 353 U. S. 232, 238, and, specifically, 
in a manner that denied the right to a full prior hear-
ing. Willner v. Conimittee on Character, 373 U. S. 96, 
103. See Cafeteria Workers v. M cElroy, supra, at 898. 
In the present case, however, this principle does not 
come into play.13 
13 The District Court made an assumption "that non-retention by 
one university or college creates concrete and practical difficulties for· 
a. profcf'sor in his subsequent academic career." 310 F . Supp., at 
979. And the Court of Appeals based its affirmance of the summary 
judgment hrgrly on the premise that "the substantial adverse effect 
non-retention is likely to have upon career interests of nn indi\·idual 
professor" nmounts to a limit:ition on fotme employment opportuni-
ties sufficient to inrnke procedura l due process guaranties. 446 F. 
2d, at 809 . :ie-11,J,,.,,~~iifi:~ii'.i'1;'po';-t;for':'TI'i'os;',;;;,'ump:' 
~- There is no suggestion of how nonretrnt ion might nffect the 
responden t's future employment prospects . Mere proof, for example, 
that his record of nonretention in one job, tuken alone, might make· 
......, ,.,. r wr•~ t-~~ .,., --
But even assuming 
arguendo that such 
a " substantial 
adverse effect " 
under these circum-
stances would con-
stitute a State 
impo sed restriction 
on liberty, the 
record contains 
no support for 




BOARD OF REGENTS v. ROTH 
larly, in the area of public employrnen t, the Court has 
held that a public college professor dismissed from an of-
fice held under tenure provisions, Slochower Y. Board of 
Education, 350 U. S. 551, and college professors and 
staff members dismissed during the terms of their con-
tracts, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, have interests 
in continued employment that are safeguarded by due 
process. Only last year, the Court held that this princi-
ple "proscribing summary dismissal from public employ-
ment without a hearing or inquiry required by clue 
process" also applied to a teacher rece11tly hired ,Yithout 
tenure or a formal contract, but nonetheless with a clearly 
implied promise of continued employment. Co1111ell Y. 
Higgenbotham, 403 U. S. 207, 208. 
Certain attributes of "property" interests protected 
by procedural due process emerge from these decisions. 
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly 
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. 
He must have more than a unilateral expectation of 
it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of en-
titlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution 
of property to protect those claims upon which people 
rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbi-
trarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitu-
tional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for 
a person to vindicate those claims. 
Property interests, of course, are not created by the 
Constitution . Rather, they are created and their di-
mensions are defined by existing rules or unck:rstand-
ingsfrlilcs or .illlctersla11cl~illgs"tE.~t·-;;;;:·;'?ei:"t"ai.ilb.ei1efits' 
to practice before the Bonrd to which procedural due process re-
quirements applied. It said th:-it the Board's discretionary power 
"must be construed to menn the exercise of a discretion to be 
exercised after fair invest.igation, with such a notice, hearing and 
opportunity to answer for the applicant as would constitute due-




dent source such 
as State law . 
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though not formalized in writing. may be "implied." 3' 
Corbin on Contracts, §§ 561-572A. Explicit contractual 
provisions may be supplernen ted by other agreements 
implied from "the promiser's words and conduct in the· 
light of the surrounding circumstances." Id., at § 562. 
And, "[t]he meaning of [the promisor's] words and acts 
is found by relating them to the usage of the past." Ibid. 
~ 
A teacher, like the respondent, without formal ten-
ure might be able to show-from the ·words and con-
duct of his superiors, from other surrounding circum-
stances and from past usage-that he has a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to job tenure. Just as this Court 
has found there to be a "common law of a particular· 
industry or of a particular plant" that may supplement 
a collective-bargaining agreement, Steelworkers v. War--
rior & Gulf Co ., 363 U. S. 574, 579, so there may be an 
unwritten "common law" in a particular university that 
certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure. 
This is particularly likely in a college or university, like 
Odessa Junior College, that has no explicit tenure system 
even for senior members of its faculty, but that nonethe-
less may have created such a system in practice. See 
Byse & Joughin, Tenure in American Higher Education 
17-2s.L 
In this case, the respondent has alleged the existence· 
of rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered 
by state officials, that may justify his legitimate claim 
of entitlement to continued employment absent "suf-. 
ficient cause." We disagree with the Court of Appeals 
insofar as it held that a mere subjective "expectancy" is 
protected by procedural due process, but the respondent 
must be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy 
of his claim of such entitlement "under the policies and 
practices of the institution." 430 F. 2d, at 943. Proof 
of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle 
-·-" We do not now hold that the respondent has 
any such legitimate claim of entitlement to job 
tenure. For " [p]roperty interests •• . are 
not created by the Constitution . Rather, they 
are created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandingtfstem~ from 
an independent source such as State law . • .• " 
Board of Regents Y.!._ Roth , ~, at 12 , If it 
is the law of Texas that a teacher in the ~es-
pondent's position has no contractual or other 
______ .,,.,._...,....... 







- CHAMBERS OF 
THE: CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§u:p-rmtt QJllUrt llf tqt 'Jlinitth .:§mug 
~~gqi:nghtn. ~. QJ. 211.;rn., 
June 21, 1972 
No. 70-36 -- Perry v. Sindermann 
No. 71-162 - Board of Regents v. Roth 
Dear Potter: 
I £ind that while the current draft circulated yesterday 
eliminates some problems, that other basic problems remain. 
In effect, the Court would recognize a federal common 
law of contracts of teachers ( and presumably all other public 
employees) enforceable in federal courts. 
Historically the law of contract is a state concern and 
I have difficulty in carving teachers out as an exception. 
Added to that, the treatment of 11 expectation_s 11 opens up a whole 
new area of uncharted concepts, that I find inappropriate for 
federal jurisdiction. If the concept of 11 expectations 1 ' was 
circumscribed, as perhaps your opinion contemplates, by 
traditional ideas of implied contracts, this would be less 
troublesome, but even there I have problems with our defining 
basis contract concepts. 
I can-accept the idea that due process calls for an administra-
tive hearing at the college level on a claim that non-renewal is 
a consequence of exercising First Amendment rights, if the further 
remedy were confined to state courts in the first instance. But I 
cannot read the 14th Amendment and implementing statutes as 
vesting jurisdiction on Federal Courts to pass on every non-
renewal of a probationary teacher, policeman, fireman, etc. 
An added difficulty for me is the suggestion that a teacher cannot 
be restricted as to what he or she says. I accept this as to speech 
outside the school, but surely a teacher of chemistry or biology 
is not free to lecture a class on his views of Rhodesia, South 




Teachers are hired for specific purposes and for me they 
can be confined to expression on that subject unless they do it on 
thei. r own time . 
I suspect that my concern arises partly because I have diffi-
culty seeing the outer boundaries of the proposed solut ion. I 
have an uneasy feeling that something like reverse Erie implica-
tions are lurking in the proposed approach and I do not want to 
"federalize" relat ionships traditionally governed by stat e law in 
state courts . 
I do not know if anyone cont emplates writing on t his, but 
I will canvass this subject as soon as anyone else indicates 
troubles along the lines I have expressed. 
l;Jf() 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to Coni erence 
P. S . Your memorandum arrived after the above was 
wr i tten. It may help but it does not reach the other poin t, not e 14 , 
last sentence, at p. 11, that "in or out of h i s classes" he can say 
what he wants . I cannot imagine you mean there is a free speech 
right to promote or oppose candidates or issues in a chemistry class. 
I£ a teacher wants to make a speech in the park, he is, of course, 
free, but not in classes where he has a specific mission. 
In haste, 
W. E . B. 
- CHAMBERS OF 
$5.ttprtme {qtttttt cf tlre ~tlttb j)tau,g 
~a:sfrhrgfott. ~. (q. 20ffe'L-$ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
June 22, 1972 
Re: No. 70-36 - Perry v. Sindermann 
No. 71-162 - Bd. of Regents v. Roth 
Dear Potter: 




Mr. Justice Stewart 





- .§u.prttttt <!Jourl llf Ure 'Jltttiu?t .§tltleil 'J.'t}a.alyittgfon, J. <!J. 2,llffeJ.1J CHAMB ERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 23, 1972 
Re: No. 71-162 - Board of Regents 
v. Roth 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~--
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to Conference 
II 
- CHAMBERS OF 
.§ttJ.tUUU {qettrl ttf tfrt 'Jltmitb' .§fltltg 
~asJringfon, ~ . <q. 2.(Jp)i,J 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. June 23, 1972 
Re: No. 70-36 Perry v. Sindermann 
No. 71-162 Board of Re gents v. Roth 
Dear Potter: 
This will confirm, for the information of the Conference, our 
conversation shortly after your opinions were first circulated. 
In view of the pendency in the Western District of Virginia 
of the Radfm·d College case (in which I was chief counsel for the 
Commonwea lth of Virginia), I would prefer to remain out of these 
cases - now that I have seen these opinions. While the factual 
situation in Radford was different (involving a salary increase rather 
than employment or r e -employment), I think it is quite likely that 
counsel for both sides will find some language in your opinions which 
they will rely upon in argument. 
If my vote is needed to decide these cases, I would like to 
discuss my position with the Conference. I may add, in the interest 
of a full disclosure, that if I were to vote I would join your opinions 
with the changes incorporated as of June 21. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
l -~~ 
- ~u.p-um.e <q:ou:rt cf t4t 'J!tnitc-b ~taus 'J!liTru;Irngfon. tf). <.g. 2.0Ji>l-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 23, 1972 
Re: No. 70-36 - Perry v. Sindermann 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
0,~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to Conference 
✓ 
- CH AMBERS OF 
;§up-rttm ~itttrl cf tfyt ] Ltiltb ~tatta-
~tul!fhtg-hm. ~ - ~- 2llffe'1-~ 
JUSTI C E H ARRY A . BLACKM U N 
June 23, 1972 
Re: No. 70-36 - Perry v. Sinderm a n n 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
/I. {,t. ;.J. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
- -
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